INTRODUCTION
Beginning with the seminal paper by Clark [3] , the economics of renewable resource conservation has primarily been studied in the context of deterministic models of resource growth. The conventional wisdom from that doi:10.1006Âjeth.2000.2685, available online at http:ÂÂwww.idealibrary.com on literature is that when the stock of the resource has a negligible effect on current welfare, 2 then some form of conservation is efficient so long as the resource is more productive than the rate at which agents discount the future. The deterministic models on which this conclusion is based are in stark contrast to reality, where environmental disturbances cause variations of considerable magnitude in the productivity of renewable resources. When resource growth is stochastic the conventional wisdom from deterministic models does not apply. In particular, conservation may be inefficient no matter how productive the resource is and a simple comparison between resource productivity and the discount rate is not sufficient to determine whether it is economically efficient to conserve a resource.
This paper analyzes the implications of environmental productivity shocks for the dynamic efficiency of resource conservation in a fairly general stochastic model of renewable resource allocation. The main purpose is to derive analytical conditions on social welfare, resource growth, the discount rate, and the distribution of environmental disturbances under which it is efficient to conserve the resource.
At a fundamental level, models of renewable resources can be viewed as extensions of the classical growth model that generalize its assumptions regarding both social welfare and the production technology. This paper is related to the literature on optimal growth under uncertainty that originated in [2] where the main issue relates to the convergence and uniqueness of the limiting distribution of the stochastic process of optimal capital stocks. In that literature, social welfare usually depends only on current consumption and it is standard to impose the requirement that the capital stock remains bounded away from zero (ruling out the possibility of extinction), either directly, or by assuming strong Inada conditions on the welfare and production functions and by assigning strictly positive probability mass to the lower bound on production.
3 A salient property characterizing the natural production or biological growth of many renewable resources is that the growth rate is low from small stocks, but it increases as the stock becomes larger, and then eventually diminishes as the environmental carrying capacity is approached. It is therefore common in models of renewable resources to allow non-concave biological production functions (for example, S-shaped production functions). 4 A non-concave biological production function makes it necessary to consider two types of conservation. The first is referred to as a safe standard of conservation, or a critical stock such that conservation is always efficient from larger stocks (though it may be inefficient to conserve the resource from smaller stocks). The second is global conservation, where the resource is conserved from any positive initial stock.
In contrast to the classical growth framework, social welfare from the harvest of renewable resources may depend on both resource consumptionÂ harvest and the resource stock. This is because the instantaneous cost of harvesting a given quantity of the resource may depend on the stock, 5 and there may be amenity or existence values associated with the resource. This feature of the welfare function for renewable resources has important implications for the dynamic behavior of optimal resource stocks. In particular, the optimal investment policy can be a non-monotone function of the current stock and, over time, optimal resource stocks may exhibit cyclical or even chaotic dynamics [9] . Our earlier work on deterministic models with a stock-dependent welfare function [14] has shown that, in the absence of environmental disturbances, conservation can be efficient even if the marginal productivity of the resource is always less than the discount rate and that the welfare function plays an important role. Further, with a non-monotonic optimal policy, conservation of the resource from low stocks does not necessarily imply the resource will be conserved from high stocks. In the presence of uncertainty this has the striking implication that an improvement in the productivity of the resource might actually increase the range of stocks from which extinction is efficient; and we illustrate this in an example developed in this paper.
The literature characterizing the dynamic efficiency of conservation under uncertainty is quite small. In a framework where welfare depends only on consumption, [1] and [18] contain some sufficient conditions for the avoidance of extinction, but these conditions are stated in terms of the Markov transition equation for optimal capital stocks and are not directly verifiable from the production and social welfare functions and the distribution of environmental disturbances. The conditions in [1] are very restrictive in our setting since they assume that the optimal investment policy is a monotone and concave function of the resource stock, properties that cannot be guaranteed in general even when the production and welfare functions are concave. A more rigorous examination of conservation and 188 OLSON AND ROY extinction in this framework is contained in [13] . Our paper generalizes the conditions for conservation derived in that paper.
A few papers on the economics of renewable resources deal with the question of conservation when there is uncertainty about resource growth and stock-dependent welfare. [17, Theorem 5] provides sufficient conditions for resource conservation in a model where an (s, S) investment policy is optimal.
6 When there are no fixed costs these conditions assume that the social welfare function is separable and linear in both consumption and the resource stock, and that the resource growth function is strictly concave. [11] analyzes a model with strictly concave growth with assumptions on social welfare that ensure the optimal investment policy is monotone. The possibility of extinction is then characterized using conditions on the kernel of the optimal stochastic process of resource stocks; however, as in [1] and [18] , these conditions are not directly verifiable from the primitives of the model. The more recent analysis in [7] assumes that social welfare is independent of the stock and linear in consumption, and also assumes a specific parametric form for the resource growth function. The assumption of linear social welfare function (in both [17] and [7] ) implies that the efficiency of conservation is solely determined by the productivity of the resource relative to the discount rate, but we shall demonstrate that this result does not hold under more general conditions.
In this paper, we analyze a fairly general model of an optimally managed, single species renewable resource in discrete time. The criterion is the maximization of the expected discounted sum of social welfare over time, where social welfare is a concave function of both consumption and the resource stock. The evolution of resource stocks is governed by a biological production function that maps investment (the current stock less consumption) and the outcome of an i.i.d. environmental productivity shock into the stock next period. Our general framework allows for non-concave production functions that exhibit``bounded growth.'' We develop verifiable conditions on social welfare, resource growth, the discount rate, and the distribution of environmental disturbances that are sufficient for conservation to be efficient.
The paper is organized as follows. The basic model and preliminary results relating to the dynamic optimization problem are outlined in Section 2. The concepts of a safe standard of conservation and global conservation and their relation to the nature of optimal policy are outlined and illustrated in Section 3. Two examples are provided to illustrate the ways in which the stochastic case differs from the deterministic one. The first example shows that higher, but uncertain, productivity may reduce the set of initial stocks 189 RESOURCE CONSERVATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY from which conservation is efficient. The second example shows that there are instances where conservation is not efficient no matter how productive the resource growth function may be. Sections 4 and 5 develop sufficient conditions for a safe standard of conservation and global conservation, respectively. Section 6 presents additional examples that provide insight into the role played by the welfare function and the lower bound on resource productivity in our conditions for conservation. Section 7 summarizes the results and contains some concluding remarks.
THE MODEL
This paper examines the issue of conservation within the context of the problem of choosing a sequence of resource consumptions (or investments) to maximize the expected discounted sum of social welfare given a stochastic biological production function for resource growth and a known distribution of environmental disturbances. At each date t, the current resource stock y t # R + is observed and a harvest or consumption level, c t , is chosen. The remaining stock represents resource investment or escapement, x t = y t &c t . The feasible set for consumption and investment is denoted by 1( y)= [(x, c) | 0 c, 0 x, c+x y]. Let [ \ t ] t=1 be an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random process taking values in some compact set, 3, a subset of the interval [\ Ä
, \Ä ] with 0<\ Ä \ \Ä < . 8 denotes the (common) distribution of the environmental disturbances \ t . Growth of the resource is governed by a biological production or stock-recruitment relationship,
, that determines the resource stock next period (gross output) as a function of current investment in the stock and the environmental disturbance such that y t+1 =f (x t , \ t+1 ). Resource growth net of investment in the stock is given by f (x, \)&x. It will be useful to refer to the upper and lower bounds on production defined by f (x)= sup \ # 3 f (x, \) and f Ä (x)=inf \ # 3 f (x, \). The resource production or growth function is assumed to satisfy the following assumptions throughout the paper:
T.4. There exists xÄ >0 such that f (x)<x for all x xÄ , and y 0 # (0, xÄ ].
Assumptions T.1 T.3 are standard monotonicity and smoothness restrictions on production. Assumption T.4 is a bounded growth restriction typically associated with a natural carrying capacity for the ecosystem beyond which the resource stock cannot grow.
The lower bound on the intrinsic growth rate (i.e., the marginal product at zero investment) is given by the lower right derivative of f, which is denoted by
] to be the lower bound on the intrinsic growth rate over all possible realizations of the random shock. We also assume
Assumption T.5 ensures that the marginal product is bounded away from zero no matter how small the investment in the resource stock. It accommodates cases where the resource production function is not capable of replacing investment from small stocks so f (x, \)<x for x close to zero. This is sometimes referred to as critical depensation in resource growth and it implies that extinction occurs from small stocks even if the resource is never harvested. Of course, T.5 also encompasses cases where the resource is productive enough to sustain itself in the absence of harvesting. We make no assumption about the concavity of the production function in general. However, as the resource exhibits bounded growth it is reasonable to assume that eventually diminishing returns must set in.
. Thus, x^(\) is the highest investment among the set of investments that maximize average productivity. In the case of a multiplicative shock x^(\) is identical for all \. We assume that:
Define x*=sup \ x^(\). If x*>0 then the production function is non-concave for at least some \. If the production function is concave for all \ then x*=0. We now state a minimal productivity assumption that insures the lower bound on resource growth is productive from some level of resource investment.
Without an assumption like T.7 there could exist a sequence of productivity shocks such that, from any stock, the resource will become extinct even under a policy of pure accumulation; however, T.7 is slightly stronger since it requires that the resource be sustainable from stocks larger than x*. Figure 1 illustrates a stochastic, non-concave biological production function that satisfies all the assumptions T.1 T.7. The existing literature on resource allocation with non-concave production focuses on models where the resource growth function is S-shaped and where the resource can always be sustained from low stocks. The model of resource growth employed here generalizes these two restrictions. First, as illustrated in Fig. 1 , it allows for the possibility of critical depensation where the resource is incapable of sustaining itself from low stocks. In such cases, the important question is whether economic efficiency implies conservation of the resource from large stocks. 7 Second, the model in this paper considers a broader class of growth functions than those that are S-shaped. Resource growth is allowed to exhibit almost any pattern of increasing and decreasing returns on the interval [0, x^(\)]. The model in this paper also allows for the possibility that the production functions cross so that one environment is most favorable for resource productivity when stocks are low, while another environment is most favorable when stocks are high.
Social welfare in each period depends on both consumption and the resource stock and is denoted U(c, y). This welfare function can incorporate consumer and producer surplus from resource consumption as well as existence or other non-consumptive values associated with the resource. Even when non-consumptive values are absent, the welfare function will typically depend on the stock through the effect of the stock on the cost of harvesting. The objective is to maximize the expected discounted sum of social welfare over time, where 0<$<1 is the discount factor.
Define Assumptions U.1 U.3 are standard. U.4 is weaker than the typical assumption that U is increasing over the domain of c. It implies that welfare is either increasing or unimodal in c. This means that for each stock there is a unique strictly positive consumption that maximizes U over the interval (0, y]. This allows for the possibility that marginal harvest costs might exceed marginal benefits at large harvest levels so that excessive consumption might decrease instantaneous welfare.
The partial history at date t is given by
, where ? t is a conditional probability measure such that ? t (1( y t ) | h t )=1. A policy is Markovian if for each t, ? t depends only on y t . A Markovian policy is stationary if ? t is independent of t. Associated with a policy ? and an initial state y is an expected discounted sum of social welfare,
, where [ y t , c t ] are generated by ?, f, and 8 in the obvious manner. The value function V( y) is defined by V( y)=sup[V ? ( y): ? is a policy]. Assumption T.4 ensures that for all y>0, V ? ( y)<+ for any policy ?. We assume that there exists a policy ? such that V ? ( y)>& from all y>0.
8 Thus, the dynamic optimization problem is well defined and the value is finite from any initial state. A policy, ?*, is optimal if V ?* ( y) V ? ( y) for all policies ? and all y and V ?* ( y)=V( y). Standard dynamic programming arguments (e.g., [19] ) imply that there exists an optimal solution such that the value function satisfies the functional equation:
Further, V is increasing and continuous. Let X( y) be the set of maximizers of the expression on the right hand side of the functional equation. X( y) is an upper-hemicontinuous correspondence that admits a measurable selection. X( y) shall be referred to as the (stationary) optimal investment correspondence, while C( y)=y&X( y) is the optimal consumption correspondence. Every measurable selection from X( y) generates a stationary optimal policy and vice-versa. The maximum and minimum selections from 
, and h ( y)=f (X m ( y)). The properties of these two selections are particularly important in characterizing resource conservation.
We now state some well-known results about the monotonicity of optimal policies under the assumption:
Define u(x, y)=U( y&x, y). U.5 implies that u 12 0, i.e., u is a supermodular function on the set [(x, y): ( y&x, y) # P 0 ]. For x 1 >x 2 and y 1 >y 2 this is equivalent to [u( [20, Section 3] ). The economic interpretation of U.5 is that it is a complementarity condition under which an increase in the current resource stock raises the marginal value of investment in future stocks.
Given this form of complementarity, optimal investment is a monotonic correspondence (see e.g., [6, Proposition 2] ). The correspondence X( y) is ascending if x # X( y) and
Lemma 1. If U.5 holds then X( y) is an ascending correspondence and X m ( y) and X M ( y) are nondecreasing in y.
CHARACTERIZING CONSERVATION IN A STOCHASTIC ENVIRONMENT
This paper defines resource conservation to be an outcome where the stock is strictly bounded away from zero with probability one. This concept of resource conservation requires that the resource does not become extinct in finite time, nor does the stock size become arbitrarily close to zero, even if the worst environment is realized in all periods. The paper focuses on two types of conservation, global conservation and the existence of a safe standard of conservation. A safe standard of conservation exists if, starting from any initial stock larger than ;, the optimal sequence of resource stocks on any sample path is almost surely bounded away from extinction by ;.The stock may become extinct or approach extinction from initial stocks smaller than ;.
Definition. Global conservation occurs if lim inf
This definition of global conservation is stronger than requiring that the stock remain positive with probability one. It seems reasonable that allowing the resource stock to come arbitrarily close to zero does not constitute conservation, even though the resource may never actually be reduced to zero in finite time. Hence, our definition of conservation rules out asymptotic extinction as well as outcomes where the support of the limiting distribution of stocks has zero as an endpoint with no probability mass.
What must be the nature of optimal investment in order to ensure the two kinds of conservation defined above? Global conservation requires that optimal investment be positive from all stocks greater than zero. Under positive investment, if extinction occurs from any stock it must also occur from stocks close to zero. Therefore, global conservation is ensured if investment is positive, and if for stocks within a neighborhood of zero, the optimal stock next period does not decrease below its current level no matter how adverse the environmental disturbance; i.e., there exists`>0 such that h Ä ( y) y for all y # (0,`). Next, consider a safe standard of conservation. Much of the existing literature considers the existence of safe standard of conservation under conditions analogous to U.5. As noted in Lemma 1, the optimal investment function h Ä ( y) is then a non-decreasing function of the stock. In this case a safe standard of conservation exists if there is a level of current stock ; such that the optimal stock next period is at least as large as ; even under the worst state of nature, i.e., h Ä (;) ;. This represents a safe standard since the monotonicity of optimal investment in current stock implies that the resource remains above ; almost surely from all stocks larger than ;.
While the standard approach is to impose an assumption like U.5, it is conceivable that such an assumption might be too restrictive in certain settings. This may happen if changes in the stock influence the marginal utility of consumption more than changes in consumption, for example, because the marginal harvest cost falls very sharply with increase in stock size. Therefore, it also seems useful to study the existence of safe standard of conservation under more general conditions where there may not be any monotonic selection from the optimal investment correspondence. In that case, even if the optimal policy from ; is to accumulate the resource, it is possible that extinction is optimal from stocks higher than ;. In our earlier paper [14] , we provide a deterministic example where extinction is optimal from low and high stocks while conservation is optimal from intermediate stocks. The basic intuition is that if U cy is positive and very large, then the marginal utility of consumption can be high enough at large stocks to warrant a harvest that leads to extinction, while a more moderate harvest is optimal from intermediate stocks. Thus, in order for ; to be a safe standard of conservation it needs to be shown that the optimal stock next period is almost surely above ; for all values of the current stock above ;, i.e., h Ä ( y) ; for all y ;. When the possibility of a nonmontonic optimal investment function is combined with stochastic environmental disturbances, the implications for conservation can be somewhat surprising. As the following example shows, uniformly better stochastic resource productivity can reduce the set of stocks from which conservation is optimal. Example 1. The example is a stochastic version of Example 3.1 in [14] . The resource growth function is given by f (x, \)=\F(x), where:
The social welfare function is:
where p=10.0, :=1.0, and ;=2.0. With these parameter values the social welfare function satisfies U.1 U.4, but not U.5. The discount rate is given by $=1Â1.47, which corresponds to the higher discounting case considered in [14] . For parametric examples like this the optimal policy can be found using numerical dynamic programming methods. Figure 2(a) shows the resource production function and the mapping from stocks in period t to stocks in period t+1 under an optimal policy when \=1.0 with probability one. This represents the poor productivity case. Extinction is optimal from both low and high stocks, while conservation is optimal from intermediate stocks. Figure 2 (b) depicts resource production and the functions that govern the transition of optimal stocks for the case where \=1.0 with probability 0.999 and \=3.0 with probability 0.001. This represents a first order stochastic increase in the distribution of the (multiplicative) environmental disturbances. Resource productivity is always at least as good and sometimes better than in the poor productivity case. The surprising outcome is that the resource fails to survive two consecutive good environmental disturbances. Since this happens with probability one along any time path of disturbances, it is almost surely optimal to harvest the resource to extinction from all initial stocks. This is not simply an artifact of an improvement in resource productivity. If \=3.0 with probability one, then conservation is optimal from all initial stocks. It is the combined influences of a nonconcave resource growth function, environmental uncertainty, and the relation between the stock and consumption in social welfare that are the driving forces behind the outcome of this example. The example provides
FIG. 2(a).
Extinction from low and high stocks, conservation from intermediate stocks.
FIG. 2(b).
Increased resource productivity leads to almost sure extinction.
197 one illustration of why it is important to study these factors together in order to better understand their role in determining economic incentives for the conservation of resources. Conventional analysis of conservation in deterministic models focuses on the relationship between the discount rate and the growth rate of the resource as the primary determinant of the efficiency of conservation. If the resource is $-productive in the sense that the discounted maximum average productivity of the resource is greater than one, then some form of conservation is optimal. In general, when resource growth is stochastic it is not possible to ensure the efficiency of conservation by focusing solely on the productivity of the resource relative to the discount rate. This is true even if social welfare is independent of the stock. The following example developed by Mirman and Zilcha [12] shows that no matter how productive the resource growth function may be there are instances where conservation is not efficient.
Example 2. Let the resource production function be defined by f (x, \) =\x 1Â2 , where \ is distributed uniformly on some (suitably chosen) compact interval 0<\ Ä \ \Ä < . Since lim x Ä 0 f $(x, \)= for all \, the intrinsic growth rate is infinite for all \. The utility function is not specified directly. Instead, Mirman and Zilcha specify a value function V that satisfies
. This implies that if x is the optimal investment from a stock y, then h Ä ( y)=f (x, \ Ä )<y so that the optimal policy under the worst environment exhausts the resource in the limit from any initial stock. They show indirectly that there exists a well behaved utility function that generates the desired value function. In their example, the support of the limiting distribution of optimal resource stocks has zero as an endpoint. This endpoint has no probability mass so that complete exhaustion of the stock occurs with zero probability; however, for any =>0, there is some finite time period when the stock falls below = with strictly positive probability. The net result is that even though the resource is infinitely productive for all outcomes of \, optimal resource stocks do not satisfy either definition of conservation given above.
This example clearly shows that when resource productivity is affected by environmental disturbances then conservation cannot be guaranteed by conditions on resource productivity and discounting alone.
9 Instead, it is necessary to consider the interaction between resource productivity and the social welfare function, as well as the role of the lower bound on resource growth when developing conditions that are sufficient for an optimal policy to satisfy the two kinds of conservation as outlined above. That is the main purpose of the analysis in Sections 4 and 5.
THE EXISTENCE OF A SAFE STANDARD OF CONSERVATION
This section examines the conditions under which there is a safe standard of conservation under an optimal policy. Before we go into aspects of the problem that involve intertemporal trade-offs, there is one class of readily identifiable situations in which conservation is always efficient. These are situations where even a myopic agent will never harvest the resource to extinction. If the marginal utility from consumption is negative when investment falls below the level needed to maintain the stock at its current level under the worst productivity shock, then investment by a myopic agent will be sufficient to at least replenish the stock. Since an optimizing agent never consumes more than a myopic one, this ensures that conservation is efficient. Proposition 1 outlines the conditions explicitly. . If U c ( y&x, y) 0 it cannot be optimal to invest less than x from y, even for a myopic agent. Hence, X m ( y) x. Since the resource stock next period is at least f (X m ( y), \) f Ä (x), the proof follows by induction.
is at least x. Under U.5, the optimal investment policy is ascending in x so from any y x, optimal investment is never less than x. K Observe that Proposition 1 does not apply when social welfare is strictly increasing in consumption. In what follows, we derive conditions for a safe standard of conservation that are also applicable to situations where a myopic agent would not conserve the resource. The analysis begins with the case where the stock and investment are complementary in the sense of U.5. Then we consider the general case.
To obtain a tight condition for conservation it is necessary to overcome the technical difficulties caused by the nonconvexity of the feasible set for the dynamic optimization problem when the resource production function is not concave. Our methodology is to first consider a convexified resource allocation problem obtained by taking the convex hull of the production function for each \. We derive a condition that ensures a safe standard of conservation for this modified problem and we then show that this is also a safe standard of conservation for the original problem.
Define a modified production function
and consider the dynamic optimization problem where F replaces f. For the modified problem, let W( y) be the value function and /( y) the optimal (investment) policy function. As in the original optimization problem, define
Since F is concave for all \, W( y) is concave. Let W$ + denote the right-derivative of W. For c optimal from y in the modified problem it can be shown that W$ + ( y) U c (c, y)+U y (c, y), and if c>0 then W is differentiable at y with W$( y)=U c (c, y)+U y (c, y).
10 Note that any policy that is feasible in the original problem is also feasible in the modified problem. In addition, if the optimal policy in the modified problem is such that /( y) x* for all y f Ä (x*) then / is also feasible in the original problem and so it must be an optimal policy in the original problem.
Consider the class of welfare functions for which U.5 holds, i.e., there is complementarity between investment and the stock. In this case, the minimum selection X m ( y) from the optimal investment policy correspondence is monotone and, as discussed in the previous section, the existence of a safe standard of conservation is equivalent to the existence of a strictly positive stock ; such that h Ä ( ;) ;. In deterministic optimal growth models with nonconcave production function and stock-independent welfare, the existence of a safe standard of conservation is ensured by a``$-productivity'' requirement that the maximum discounted average productivity of the resource growth function be greater than one (see, [5] ). If either the production function is stochastic (as in [13] ) or the marginal utility from consumption is stock-dependent (as in [14] ), the existence of a safe standard of conservation also depends on properties of the welfare function. Proposition 2 provides a sufficient condition for a safe standard of conservation that extends these results.
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10 Let x be optimal from y 0. Then x is feasible from y+= for =>0. The principle of optimality then yields (W( y+=)&W( y))Â= (U( y+=&x, y+=)&U( y&x, y))Â=. Letting = a 0 yields W$ + ( y) U c (c, y)+U y (c, y), where c=y&x. Similarly, if y&x>0 then x is feasible from y&= and (W( y)&W( y&=))Â= (U( y&x, y)&U( y&x&=, y&=))Â= for =>0, which implies W$ & ( y) U c (c, y)+U y (c, y). Then it must be that W is differentiable at y since concavity implies W$ & ( y) W$ + ( y).
Given an output, y, and an input x, define the set of economically viable investments from y that would lead to a resource stock smaller than x by 9( y, x)=[z: y&!( y) z x y].
proposition 2. Under U.5 if there exists some x # (x*, xÄ ) such that f Ä (x)>x and
then x is a safe standard of conservation.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the modified (convex) problem. Let x # (x*, xÄ ) and define y$=F (x)=f Ä (x) and x$=/( y$). We want to show that x$ x. Suppose not. Since y$&x$>0, the principle of optimality yields U( y$&x$, y$)&U( y$&x$&=, y$) $E[W(F(x$+=, \))&W(F(x$, \))] for sufficiently small =>0. It follows that
by / m (F(x, \)) x$=/ m (F (x)) and U.5.
Since x$ # 9( f Ä (x), x) the sequence of inequalities contradicts the assumption in the proposition, hence x$ x in the modified problem. As a consequence, starting from any y 0 f Ä (x), investments always remain above x in the convexified problem. But this means that starting from any y 0 f Ä (x), the optimal stock is at least f Ä (x) in the original problem. If not, there is some policy in the original problem that yields greater expected value than the policy associated with /. But such a policy is feasible in the modified problem so this would contradict the optimality of the policy / in the modified problem. K The intuition underlying Proposition 2 is as follows. Given the worst production from some investment level consider a policy that depletes the resource below the original level. If all such policies have a marginal value of consumption strictly less than the expected discounted marginal value of investment, then it must be the case that the optimal investment is one that sustains the stock. Since optimal policies are monotonic under U.5, the stock is conserved under all productivity shocks and from any larger initial stock. Observe that the condition in Proposition 2 reduces to the classical $-productivity condition when welfare is independent of the stock and there is no uncertainty.
11
Next, we consider the general case where the welfare function does not necessarily satisfy U.5. In this case, the minimum selection from the optimal investment correspondence is not necessarily monotonic in current stock size and showing that ; is a safe standard of conservation requires not only that h Ä ( ;) ;, but, in addition that h Ä ( y) ; for all y ;. Define
A(x) represents the minimum marginal value of investment normalized by the marginal welfare from consumption when evaluated at all economically viable investments from f (x) that would reduce the stock below x.
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11 It is straight-forward to see how the main assumption of Proposition 2 rules out outcomes like that in the example contained in [12] . In that example, U depends only on consumption and U c (c)>0 for all c. Under these simplifications the main assumption in Proposition 2 can be stated as:
) be the optimal policy from an initial stock, f Ä (x), obtained under resource production in the worst environment. Three important properties of the solution in the example are: (i) it satisfies the stochastic Ramsey Euler equation
(ii) the uniqueoptimal investment and consumption policies, X( y) and C( y), are both nondecreasing, and (iii) x$<x. From these facts it follows that
, but this is clearly ruled out by the condition above.
Lemma 2. If there exists an x x* such that f (x)>x and
Proof of Lemma 2. Let x$=X m ( f (x))=X m (F (x)) and suppose x$<x. Then it follows that
by x>x$ and concavity of W and F
This contradicts A(x) $Ef $(x, \)>1. K This lemma characterizes outcomes under the best possible realization of the random shock affecting resource production. If the marginal value of investment valued in terms of consumption times the expected internal rate of return on investment exceeds one plus the discount rate for all economically feasible investments that would reduce the stock, then it is not optimal to undertake such an investment and the optimal investment is one that enhances the stock. However, this does not rule out the possibility that in worse states of nature, the optimal policy leads to a reduction in stock and eventual extinction. In other words, it does not guarantee a safe standard of conservation.
Define m( y, x)=inf [U y ( y&z, y): x z y]. Given an initial stock y, m( y, x) provides a lower bound on the marginal stock effect over feasible investments larger than x. Using this, define
The numerator of the expression defining B(x) is a lower bound on the marginal value of sustainable investment under the best state while the denominator represents the marginal value of sustainable investment under the worst state. Thus, B(x) is a lower bound on the ratio of the marginal value of sustainable investment under the best realization of the productivity shock to that in the worst case. The concavity of U implies that B(x) is less than 1. In the deterministic case, B(x) differs from unity only to the extent that the lower bound on the marginal stock effect provided by m( f (x), x) is different from the value of the marginal stock effect realized at (c, y)=( f (x)&x, f (x)).
The next proposition shows that the existence of a safe standard of conservation can be achieved by replacing A(x) by B(x) in the condition of Lemma 2.
, then x is a safe standard of conservation.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the modified (convex) problem. Note that A(x) 1 B(x) so that Lemma 2 implies x$ x where x$ # /(F (x)). Next, suppose there exists some y F (x) such that / m ( y)<x. This implies
This contradicts B(x) $EF$(x, \)=B(x) $Ef $(x, \)>1 (since x x*). Hence, we have shown that from all initial stocks y 0 F (x)=f Ä (x), the optimal stock in the next period of the convexified problem is at least f Ä (x). As in the proof of Proposition 2, this means that starting from any y 0 f Ä (x), investment always remains above x in the original problem. K As indicated earlier, the term B(x) in the condition outlined in Proposition 3, is less than one. This means the expected internal rate of return on investment in the resource must be larger than 1Â$ for the conditions of the proposition to hold. 12 The proposition requires conditions stronger than expected $-productivity in order to guarantee that conservation is efficient. In the case when there is no uncertainty and social welfare depends only on current consumption, B(x)=1 and the condition outlined in Proposition 3 reduces to the usual delta-productivity condition.
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It is easy to see that the condition for a safe standard of conservation in the general case as outlined in Proposition 3 is stronger than the one we have derived in Proposition 2 for the case where stock and investment are complementary. Both are conditions of the form $E[ (x) f $(x, \)]>1, where the term (x) represents welfare effects. These originate from two sources. First, the marginal value of investment in additional stock reflects the marginal utility of future consumption as well as the direct marginal welfare associated with increments to the future stock. Thus, even in a deterministic setting, if the level of investment is just sufficient to sustain the current stock (so that consumption and the stock are constant across periods), the marginal welfare gain from investment differs from the sacrifice in marginal welfare from current consumption. Second, the fact that the resource production function is stochastic implies that the marginal value of investment is evaluated over all possible realizations of the environmental disturbance. The ratio of the marginal value of investment to the marginal utility of current consumption generally differs across states of nature. In general, (x) represent a lower bound on the ratio of the marginal gain in value from an increase in investment to the marginal welfare sacrificed by the corresponding reduction in current consumption. In the case where consumption and the stock are complementary (Proposition 2), it is possible to derive a much tighter bound on this ratio compared to the general case analyzed in Proposition 3. This is because complementarity implies that the marginal welfare gain from an increase in the future stock is monotonic in future consumption. In the general case, this property is lost. Further, to account for the potential non-monotonicity of the optimal investment policy it is necessary to ensure that there is no stock higher than the (potential) safe standard from which it is optimal to invest less than the safe level. The net outcome of these considerations is that a more general approach than expected-delta productivity must be taken in the formulation of any condition for conservation in the stochastic case.
GLOBAL CONSERVATION
In this section we examine the conditions under which the resource is conserved from any initial stock and along any realized path of the random shock. As discussed in Section 3, this is ensured if we can show that h Ä ( y)= f Ä (X m ( y)) y for all y in some neighborhood of zero. In particular, this requires that f Ä ( y) y in a neighborhood of zero. Otherwise, the resource production function is characterized by critical depensation and, even under a policy of pure accumulation, the resource is not productive enough to conserve itself from low stocks. Therefore, in the rest of this section we assume:
First, we provide conditions that are sufficient to rule out immediate extinction as an optimal policy. This is equivalent to guaranteeing that optimal investment in the resource is strictly positive from all initial stocks. Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose not. Then for some y>0, X m ( y)=0. Consider an alternative action from y where consumption is reduced to y&= and =>0 is invested. Then consume the entire output next period, f (=, \)>0. From the principle of optimality
The condition in the lemma implies
which, in turn implies
but this contradicts (2) for = small enough. The proof of (b) is trivial. K This lemma encompasses the Inada condition used to guarantee interior investment in the standard stochastic growth model (see, for example, [2] ).
14 As an example of its application in the case of stock-dependent welfare, it is satisfied for the class of exponential welfare functions U(c, y)=c : y ; , where :>0, ; 0, and :+;<1. It is easy to see that strictly positive investment is a necessary requirement for global conservation. The conditions given in the lemma above are sufficient for this to occur. Optimal investment may, however, be positive under weaker conditions. So, the results below simply assume that optimal investment is strictly positive.
As in the discussion on safe standard of conservation, our first result provides conditions under which even a myopic agent will conserve the resource from all initial stocks. 
We now proceed to derive conditions for global conservation that apply in situations where a myopic agent might not conserve the stocks. In our analysis of a safe standard of conservation, we were able to obtain considerable leverage by taking the convex hull of the production set and studying the modified convex dynamic optimization problem. This was a fruitful approach because the best hope for finding a safe standard of conservation is in the region where average productivity of the resource is maximized. Further, for stocks above this region and for the class of resource production functions admissible under T.1 T.7, the convex hull coincides with the original production possibilities for the resource. Unfortunately, this approach is not useful in analyzing global conservation. Global conservation requires conservation in a neighborhood of zero which is precisely where resource production possibilities are most likely to exhibit nonconvexities. This complicates our task considerably.
From concavity of U it follows that U c ( y&x, y)+U y ( y&x, y) is nonincreasing in y so that
for y n f Ä (x n ). Using this, U y 0, and the Ramsey Euler equation we obtain
This yields a contradiction for n large enough. K
The first condition in Proposition 6 simply requires that, as the stock goes to zero, sustainable investment is economically viable under the lower bound on resource productivity. The second condition is the analogue of the condition in Proposition 3 in the case where the stock approaches zero, except that the numerators are different. The source of this difference is that Proposition 3 uses information from the convex hull of the production function, whereas in the neighborhood of the origin the production function may be convex. 15 
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
The results of this paper clearly show that the relation between social welfare and resource productivity is important in determining whether conservation is efficient. It is also apparent that the lower bound on resource productivity has a strong influence on whether or not our sufficient conditions for conservation will be satisfied. The role of these effects is illustrated in three examples. The first example illustrates the conditions under a stochastic version of the logistic resource growth function that is common in applications, and the class of welfare functions exhibiting constant relative risk aversion or intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The next example illustrates the conditions for a social welfare function of the form U(c, y)=c : y ; +#y and a resource production function characterized by multiplicative environmental disturbances. This example highlights the role played by the contribution of the stock to social welfare. In each of these examples the social welfare function satisfies assumption U.5. The final example is a continuation of Example 1. The social welfare function of that example allows us to contrast the conditions for the general case where U.5 is violated with those that are relevant when the stock and investment are complementary in welfare in the sense of U.5.
Example 3. Let resource growth be governed by a stochastic version of the logistic growth function f (x, \)=x+\x(1&xÂk)) with 0<\ Ä \ \Ä 1, and suppose that social welfare is given by U(c, y)=c : Â:, where 0{:<1. The parameter k represents the natural carrying capacity of the environment under all states of nature and it is assumed that x 0 k. Note that the production function satisfies T.1 T.7 on the interval [0, k]. Further, f is concave so that the relevant safe standard of conservation, if it exists, is at x*=0. For this example, the table below summarizes the parametric conditions that are sufficient for each type of conservation under the propositions of this paper.
This clearly shows the differences between the various sufficient conditions for resource conservation. The table also provides a nice illustration of how social welfare and resource productivity interact to determine the efficiency of conservation under conditions of uncertainty. For instance, when applied to this example, Proposition 3 requires that the discounted average rate of return from investing in the resource must exceed one by an amount that depends on the ratio of the worst and best productivity shock and the welfare parameter : that encompasses both risk aversion and the willingness to substitute consumption across time. Ceteris paribus, as the relative difference between the worst and best productivity shocks becomes larger or as the agent exhibits more risk aversionÂless willingness to substitute consumption across time, the average productivity of the resource must be higher in order for resource conservation to be guaranteed under Proposition 3. In principle, all three conditions in the table are sufficient for global conservation since the production function is concave and social welfare is independent of the stock and satisfies U.5. It can be seen directly that conditions implied by Propositions 5 and 6 are equivalent, while the condition in Proposition 2 is weaker than those of Propositions 3, 5 and 6. So for this example the weakest sufficient condition for resource conservation is provided by Proposition 2, and it involves a joint restriction on the discount rate, the welfare function, the lower bound on resource productivity, and the productivity of the resource in all states of nature.
Example 4 (Safe standard of conservation). Consider the social welfare function U(c, y)=c Terms involving ; embody the stock effect on consumptive welfare. If ;=0, then the first term in square brackets reflects stochastic influence. If ;>0 then stochastic influence is apparent in all four terms in the square bracket. In the deterministic case the first two terms drop out and last two terms in the square brackets capture the effect of stock dependence.
Example 5 (global conservation). Consider the social welfare function in Example 1, U(c, y)=pc&e :c&;y , with p>0, ;>0 (so that U y >0), and p>: (so that U c (0, 0)>0). Assumption U.5 holds if :(:&;)>0. In that case, the conditions for global conservation as stated in Proposition 5 reduce to:
; p&:+ $E f $(0, \)>1.
In the general case of Proposition 6, the conditions for global conservation are that the resource exhibit expected $-productivity at zero, or that $Ef$(0, \)>1. In this example it is easy to see that when the stock and investment are complementary the conditions for global conservation are weaker than expected delta-productivity. Note that the ratio ;Â( p&:) represents the intrinsic marginal rate of substitution between the stock and consumption, or the marginal value of stocks near zero relative to the marginal value of consumption. The larger this ratio, the lower is the productivity requirement that the resource must satisfy for global conservation to be optimal.
CONCLUSION
This paper shows that when renewable resources are subject to environmental productivity shocks, the efficiency of natural resource conservation depends on several factors including the discount rate, the social welfare function, the marginal productivity of investment in the resource, and the lower bound on resource productivity. The next table summarizes the implications of the results of this paper for the efficiency of resource conservation under various conditions. For ease of comparison the table assumes marginal social welfare from consumption is positive. The table's first three rows summarize the implications of the results in this paper for resource conservation in the general case, in the case where there is complementarity between the investment and the stock, and in the case where social welfare depends only on consumption or harvest. 16 The last row provides the deterministic benchmark, again when social welfare is independent of the stock. 
